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Abstract—This is the era of smart devices or things which are
fueling the growth of Internet of Things (IoT). It is impacting
every sphere around us, making our life dependent on this
technological feat. It is of high concern that these smart things
are being targeted by cyber criminals taking advantage of het-
erogeneity, minuscule security features and vulnerabilities within
these devices. Conventional centralized IT security measures have
limitations in terms of scalability and cost. Therefore, these
smart devices are required to be monitored closer to their
location ideally at the edge of IoT networks. In this paper,
we explore how some security features can be implemented at
the network edge to secure these smart devices. We explain
the importance of Network Function Virtualization (NFV) in
order to deploy security functions at the network edge. To
achieve this goal, we introduce NETRA– a novel lightweight
Docker-based architecture for virtualizing network functions to
provide IoT security. Also, we highlight the advantages of the
proposed architecture over the standardized NFV architecture in
terms of storage, memory usage, latency, throughput, load average,
scalability and explain why the standardized architecture is not
suitable for IoT. We study the performance of proposed NFV-
based edge analysis for IoT security and show that attacks can
be detected with more than 95% accuracy in less than a second.
Index Terms—IoT, Edge, Security, NFV, Docker.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a technology that facilitates
interaction between physical and digital world. It is comprised
of sensors and other electronic equipments that are remotely
controlled using the existing network infrastructure. A recent
Gartner report [1] says, by 2021, $2.5 million per minute will
be spent on these devices. IoT generates tonnes of data that
can be extracted to give better quality of life by providing
value-added services such as home automation, health care,
industry automation etc. Though it is expected to change our
lives rapidly, with huge volume of data on the network, it is
exposed to general security threats such as denial of service
(DoS) attacks and other cyber attacks. Thus, an important
question is : how secure are these IoT devices?
Recent attacks like Mirai [2], IoTroop and Stuxnet answer
the above question very well. These attacks focused to make
use of vulnerabilities in IoT devices itself. With the emergence
of low cost devices and cut-throat competitions, manufacturers
rush these IoT devices to the market almost without any
security features or with very minimal ones. Also, these
low cost tiny resource-constrained devices are not fit to use
conventional IT security measures. Hence, there is a pressing
need to improve security in the IoT environment. Lots of
research has been done on how to make the current security
systems more robust and viable to take care of IoT [3]. As the
IoT device level security is erratic, incorporation of security
features at network edge may help securing these devices. In
this paper, we focus to push our research towards the network
edge i.e. more closer to the IoT devices.
Due to the massive number of heterogeneous devices, defin-
ing static rules for security purposes will not help. Instead,
individual traffic analysis of these devices is required to
understand their usual pattern and anomalous traffic. If this
analysis is done in a centralized manner, scalability issues
will arise. Thus, pushing the traffic analysis to the network
edge will be helpful. Machine learning is used to cater various
security needs of today’s networks [4]. In this paper, we
make use of machine learning algorithms to perform traffic
analysis at the network edge, thus deeming it useful for the
IoT environment.
At the network edge, usually we find devices with lower
computational capabilities such as IoT gateways, home routers
etc. The challenge is to implement security features for IoT at
these edge infrastructure. For this purpose, Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) can be used. NFV is a technique by
which we can virtualize the traditional network functions using
their software counterparts. The use of NFV technology to
provide IoT security has been attracting the attention of re-
searchers recently. The number of companies that are pushing
the research and development of NFV paradigm is growing
steadily since NFV can improve cost efficiency, flexibility,
performance and reduce the capital expenditures (CAPEX) and
operational expenditures (OPEX).
The network functions that are implemented are called as
virtual network functions or VNFs and are usually deployed
on high-capacity servers or cloud infrastructure. Given the
low computational requirement at the network edge i.e. IoT
gateway, we need a virtualization technique that is lightweight
and scalable [5]. As an alternative, Docker containers promise
one such environment, which open up opportunities for the
security functions to be implemented as Docker VNFs.
A Docker container is a stand-alone and light-weight exe-
cutable package of software that includes everything needed
to run it: code, settings, system libraries and system tools [6].
Containers isolate the software running in it from its surround-
ings thus giving us a software level isolation unlike the hard-
ware level isolation of virtual machines (VMs). Architecture
of both VMs and Dockers are shown in Fig. 1.
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2TABLE I: Comparison of Docker and Virtual Machines
Feature Docker Virtual Machines
Start time <50 ms 30 - 45 seconds
Stop time <50 ms 5 - 10 seconds
System Overhead No overhead Overhead due to hypervisor
Storage space Tens of MBs in size Tens of GBs in size
Scalability Highly scalable Not easily scalable
CPU load when idle Normal ∼1.5% more than docker
Isolation Less isolation due to software virtualization More isolation due to hardware virtualization
Network round trip latency ∼75 µs ∼60 µs
I/O throughput (Read and Write) 100000 I/Os per second 50000 I/Os per second
 Host Operating system Operating system
Infrastructure Infrastructure
Hypervisor Docker Engine
App 1 App 2 App 3
App 1 App 2 App 3Bins/Libs Bins/Libs Bins/Libs
Bins/Libs Bins/Libs Bins/LibsGuest OS Guest OS Guest OS
Virtual Machine 
Architecture
Docker 
Architecture
Fig. 1: Architectural Comparison of VMs and Dockers.
In Fig. 1, we can see that the hypervisor in VM, is replaced
by the docker engine in containers. Containers are smaller
than VMs that enable faster start up with better performance,
less isolation and greater compatibility due to sharing of the
host’s kernel. Also, huge disk space can be saved as bulky
guest operating systems for each application, are not required.
Each application can be built into a docker image and hosted
in cloud. It results in zero building time as the same docker
image can be used to spawn many docker instances of the
same application. The other key differences between VMs and
Dockers are shown in Table I.
In this paper, NETRA– a novel Docker based architecture
is introduced for virtualizing network functions at IoT gate-
way. Here, each network function can be fetched from the
cloud and deployed immediately onto the IoT gateway. Using
the architecture, we implement VNFs that can improve the
security of IoT environment and test using IoT devices like
smart cameras, smart sockets etc. We collect real time traffic
from a TP-Link smart camera to train our edge-analysis VNF
discussed in Section III. Our models are able to successfully
detect attacks with ∼95% accuracy in nearly a second.
The rest of the paper outlines the way to harness the power
of Dockers and NFV to provide a secure platform for IoT.
First, differences between the existing VM-based platform and
the proposed Docker-based architecture are discussed. Later,
performance evaluation is presented. Finally, we discuss re-
lated works in this domain before making concluding remarks.
II. ARCHITECTURE
In the domain of network function virtualization, number of
research and development activities are going on to provide a
robust and efficient platform. One such standardized platform
is the Open Platform for Network Function Virtualization or
OPNFV [7]. It is patronized by leading companies and orga-
nizations. OPNFV provides a platform for the development
and evolution of many NFV components that can be deployed
in various open source ecosystems. In this paper, we propose
NETRA – a new architecture for deploying virtual network
functions in low computational devices at the network edge
like the IoT gateway. In order to compare, we have imple-
mented both the architectures. In this section, we describe the
existing VM-based architecture (OPNFV) and our proposed
architecture using Docker containers (NETRA).
A. VM-based Architecture
OPNFV (Open Platform for NFV) is basically an open-
stack environment for deploying various VNFs using VMs.
OPNFV provides various installers like Compass, Fuel etc., for
deploying the same. Because of the ease of use, Fuel [8] has
been selected and 5 VMs are created to set up the environment.
Fig. 2 shows the high-level view of the environment based on
the OPNFV architecture. We describe each of the three layers
in the architecture below.
Fig. 2: OPNFV based OpenStack deployment of NFVs.
1) OPNFV Master: This is the layer where the OPNFV
master is deployed. In our case, it is the Fuel Master, which is
responsible for deploying the OPNFV nodes in the bottom
layers. As shown in Fig. 2, the master has a dedicated
network card for each of the operations like administration,
management, storage etc. It is important to note that this layer
does not appear at the network edge rather it resides one layer
above the nodes.
32) OPNFV Nodes: This layer is the crux where the VNFs
are deployed and it depicts the network edge in IoT scenario.
We deployed 3 nodes or PODs (Point of Devices) that act as
various elements of a NFV-based IoT environment. One VM is
running OpenDayLight controller and the other two nodes
are emulating different network functions (WAP and firewall).
One of the biggest problems with an open stack deployment is
the need for PXE booting ability, which is very unlikely to be
present in the devices at this layer. Another noteworthy point
is that, each of the nodes acts as a VNF, which implies that
multiple VMs are required at the network edge.
3) Client Layer: The client layer is at the user end wherein
the Fuel client can be accessed using a web interface. Using
the Fuel client, one can deploy various VNFs with the help of
the OPNFV master. In our experiment, we deployed the nodes
detailed above with the help of the OpenStack interface
through the Fuel client.
In [9], it is discussed that IoT gateways have nearly the
same specifications as that of a Raspberry Pi 3. Therefore, we
model the network edge device with the help of a Raspberry
Pi in this deployment. During the deployment, we noticed
few shortcomings of OPNFV which renders it not suitable
for use at network edge. The deployment of OPNFV demands
at least 3 nodes (VMs) for deployment. This may be useful
at an enterprise level environment. But it is futile to employ
such an architecture at the edge of IoT network because the
edge devices (i.e. IoT gateways) are of limited resource.
As explained later in Section IV, this approach is not
beneficial for the network edge scenario. Typically, the VMs in
the OPNFV architecture require high computational abilities
that cannot be expected at the network edge. Also, the deploy-
ment times are also very slow with OPNFV. Though OPNFV
provides a standardized approach for deploying VNFs, it is
not feasible enough to be used at the edge of IoT network.
B. Proposed Docker-based architecture
Having said about the issues faced by OPNFV, we require
a robust and efficient architecture that can facilitate the de-
ployment of VNFs at the edge of the network. In this section,
we present our Docker-based architecture – NETRA for NFV-
based Edge TRaffic Analysis. The proposed architecture helps
in creating and deploying VNFs in low computational devices.
Fig. 3 shows a high-level view of our proposed architecture.
Layers of the architecture are discussed in detail below.
1) Core Network: In this layer, connections to the cloud
servers are routed through the Internet Service Provider (ISP).
When IoT devices in the lowest layer, are activated, they talk
with their respective cloud servers viz. D-Link devices talk
with D-Link cloud. In this layer, we have the Docker Hub,
which is a repository for all the Docker images that we have
created. The Docker images can be deployed from this layer
with a docker pull command. When a new VNF has to
be deployed, it only takes a couple of minutes to build and
run the Docker VNFs.
2) IoT Gateway: This layer represents the actual network
edge of the IoT scenario. In our implementation, we use a
Raspberry Pi 3 as the IoT gateway, which hosts various Docker
VNFs. The IoT devices connect to the network that is created
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Fig. 3: Proposed Docker-based architecture with a Raspberry
Pi at network edge.
using the Wireless Access Point (WAP) VNF described in
Section II-C. The communication between the IoT devices
and external world go through this layer. Thus attacks can
be detected and mitigated at this layer. As seen in the Fig. 3,
we deploy a chain of multiple VNFs with the Raspberry Pi
designated as an IoT gateway. This chain of VNFs work
in tandem. We deploy security VNFs like firewall, intrusion
detection, software defined networking (SDN) switch, edge
analytics etc. as described in Section II-C.
3) IoT Environment: In this layer, we have the smart things
or the IoT devices that are connected to the Internet through
the above layers. In our lab, we use devices like smart bulbs,
IP cameras, smart remote controllers, smart sockets etc.
The architecture can be further extended with an SDN
controller managing the Open vSwitch running on the IoT
gateway as a VNF. As discussed in earlier sections, containers
are light-weight and can be used to run any application with
a very low overhead and faster deployment times. NETRA
also addresses the core issue of OPNFV which requires at
least three nodes at the edge. Here all the VNFs are on
the same device, yet isolated. The performance comparisons
between the two architectures in Section IV validate the fact
that dockerizing VNFs is an effective way for bringing NFV
to edge of the network.
C. Virtual Network Functions for IoT Security
With the comprehensive analysis of the two architectures,
it is evident that for an IoT environment, Docker-based VNFs
are the best suitors. We implement some VNFs, those when
coupled together, form an IoT gateway that is secure by itself
and is lightweight at the same time. The details about the
implemented VNFs are explained below.
1) WAP as VNF: In order to serve as an IoT gateway,
the Raspberry Pi must be able to connect to the devices and
forward the packets to Internet. To facilitate this, the WAP
VNF creates a wireless access point for the IoT devices to
connect using the hostapd package and also acts as a DHCP
server by running udhcpd. Since the Raspberry Pi is connected
to the Internet through Ethernet port, a simple masquerading
rule will help in forwarding the packets.
42) Firewall: One of the most important yet simplest secu-
rity function that any system demands is the firewall. Using
this VNF, we create firewall rules to block a malicious user.
The firewall rules are applied with the help of the iptables
package. In case the user needs to be unblocked, we just need
to stop the docker instance corresponding to that user’s MAC.
3) IDS: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are generally
heavy on the processor and memory due to their large rule
sets and continuous traffic analysis. In order to create a light
weight version of IDS, we use minimalistic rules pertaining
to the IoT environment on top of snort package running with
low memory option. When the IDS VNF detects a malicious
activity, it instructs the WAP VNF to kick out the malicious
user and spawns the firewall docker VNF to block the user.
4) Software Defined Switch: The Software Defined Switch
is an advanced VNF added to the IoT gateway. This VNF uses
Open vSwitch and harnesses the power of software defined
switches in managing the flows in and out of the network.
5) Edge Analytics: This VNF performs traffic analysis
at the network edge using machine learning algorithm as
discussed in Section III for detecting and mitigating malicious
attacks. The detection phase comprises of two stages : anomaly
detection and attack detection. When the incoming traffic is
detected as anomalous, the traffic is analyzed to ascertain the
type of attack. After successful detection, we mitigate the
attack using the software defined switch mentioned above.
III. EDGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss about the edge traffic analysis
using NFV and machine learning (ML). We encapsulate the
algorithms discussed below in an Edge Analytics VNF at the
IoT gateway itself. We first extract the features for training
our ML models so that we can detect anomalies in real
time. The scapy library in Python is used for performing the
feature extraction using Algorithm 1. We propose a majority
vote type detection wherein three models detect whether the
given datapoint comes from a malicious packet or not using
Algorithm 2. Once an anomaly is detected, the attack detection
module is spawned to identify whether it is a known attack
and proper mitigation is achieved through the software defined
Open Virtual Switch (OVS) VNF.
A. Feature extraction
In order to have efficient detection, it is of utmost im-
portance to have proper features to carry out the detection.
Carefully selected features aid in creating an accurate predic-
tive model. In our algorithm, the scapy librabry is used for
extracting the packets and features. For the training data, we
connected a TPLink camera to the raspberry pi and collected
packets in different scenarios: 1) with benign traffic flows, 2)
while attacking the camera with SYN flooding and 3) while
attacking the camera with ICMP flooding. SYN and ICMP
flooding are carried out using hping3 tool found in the Kali
Linux distro connected in the same network. Wireshark tool is
used to capture data in all the three scenarios and this datafile
(.pcap file) is given as the input to Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, a sampling time is set to process the packets.
This sampling time (samp) is expected to be in the order of
Algorithm 1 Feature Extraction
Input: pcap, dev-IP, attack-IP
Output: featurelist (or) datapoint
1: if online then
2: pcap⇐ sniff packet
3: extract packet (pcap, dev-IP)
4: else
5: extract packet (pcap, dev-IP)
6: sess← pktlen+ samp
7: for session do
8: featurelist⇐ extractfeatures(pkt)
9: if IP == attack-IP then
10: label← X . X represents the attack index
11: end if
12: end for
13: end if
seconds depending on the amount of packets at hand. When
we have the pcap file, the training data gets generated and
is called offline feature extraction. Once we have a model,
the algorithm switches to an online mode, wherein real-time
traffic is collected and extracted. The features are extracted in
sessions that is dependent on the packet length (pktlen) and
the previously set sampling time. Once the packet is extracted,
we extract the features like SYN flag, ACK flag, PUSH flag,
URG flag, protocol, mean of packet duration, variance of packet
length, mean of arrival times, variance of arrival times, total
number of packets etc. A total of 21 features are chosen out
of many as the prediction was not affected by adding more
features. The training data is labeled, whether it is clean or
SYN flood or ICMP flood, with the help of the attacker IP
and attacker protocol. During online feature extraction, the
packets are filtered using the device’s IP and protocol.
B. Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection is the technique that helps us in identi-
fying any unusual pattern that does not match with expected
behavior. Outliers detection or anomaly detection can thus be
used to find any malicious activity going on in the network,
if we can model the usual activities [10].
The training data is obtained by capturing packets when
there is no malicious activity and is further used to train the
models of the usual behavior. Three models are considered for
detection, namely:
• One-Class SVM : One of the popular algorithms that
learns a decision function for outliers detection is One-
Class Support Vector Machine (SVM) and is used to clas-
sify new data as either similar or anomalous. The decision
rule of the One-Class SVM is given by Equation 1 [11].
f(x) = sgn(
n∑
i=1
αiyiK(x, xi) + b) (1)
where sgn(·) is the sign function, αi are the Lagrange
functions that support the machine and K(·) is the kernel
function. In our model, the radial base function (RBF) is
chosen as the kernel.
5Algorithm 2 Anomaly Detection
Input: clean data, attacked data (or) datapoint
Output: prediction
1: if training then
2: X ← datapoints(clean csv)
3: X test← datapoints(attacked csv)
4: M1← IsolationForest(X)
5: M2← OneClassSVM(X)
6: M3← EllipticalEnvelope(X)
7: P1←M1(X test)
8: P2←M2(X test)
9: P3←M3(X test)
10: P ⇐ P1 + P2 + P3 . Testing the model
11: else
12: P1←M1(datapoint)
13: P2←M2(datapoint)
14: P3←M3(datapoint)
15: P ⇐ P1 + P2 + P3
16: end if
17: if P < 0 then
18: Anomaly Detected
19: attack detection(datapoint)
20: end if
• Isolation Forest : Instead of constructing a model for the
normal activities (packets in our case) and then identify-
ing the outliers, Isolation Forest follows a model-based
method that explicitly isolates anomalies. It does that
through an algorithm that has a linear time complexity
with a low constant and a low memory requirement [12].
The algorithm calculates an anomaly score (given by
Equation 2) to distinguish between normal cases and
anomalies.
s(x, n) = 2−
E[h(x)]
c(n) (2)
where E[h(x)] is the average path length of a point x
in the tree and c(n) is the average path length of an
unsuccessful search in the binary search tree.
• Elliptical Envelope : The Elliptical Envelope package
uses the covariance between the features to detect anoma-
lies in a Gaussian distributed dataset. It basically tries
to find an elliptical boundary that can hold most of
the data. Any data that falls outside this boundary is
classified as anomalous. This model uses the FAST-
Minimum Covariance Determinate method [13] to find
the size and shape of the ellipse with the help of the
Mahalanobis distance shown in Equation 3.
dMH =
√
(~x− ~µ)TC−1(~x− ~µ) (3)
where ~x, ~µ is the data vector and its mean. Equation 3
basically measures the deviation of a data vector from
its mean.
For testing the model, we generate a simple SYN flood attack
on the IoT device and extract features using Algorithm 1.
Our majority voting model has helped in reducing the number
of false positives and missed detections. If the model detects
an anomaly, it returns -1 and if not, returns 1. As shown in
Algorithm 2, we predict whether the test data is malicious or
benign using all the three models and decide using majority
votes. This way we harness the advantages of all the three
models combined to get efficient detection. This algorithm
runs inside a docker VNF in the IoT gateway to detect
anomalies (malicious activities) in the environment. In order
to detect the attack and block the malicious user, we call the
attack detection algorithm once an anomaly is detected.
C. Attack Detection and Mitigation
The attack detection module gets its input data point from
the anomaly detection module, when the latter classifies it
as being malicious. Once it gets its data point, it follows
Algorithm 3 to detect the kind of attack and spawns the
mitigation process if it is a known attack.
Algorithm 3 Attack Detection
Input: labeled data, datapoint
Output: attack type
1: if training then
2: t, T ⇐ test train(labeled data)
3: X train← datapoints(T )
4: Y train← labels(T )
5: X test← datapoints(t)
6: Y test← labels(t)
7: M← RandomForest(X train, Y train)
8: P ⇐M(X test) . Testing the model
9: E = diff(P, Y train) . Classification Error
10: else
11: attack type⇐M(datapoint)
12: if attack type 6= NORMAL then . If not benign
13: call OVS vNF
14: end if
15: end if
For this module, we took training data while attacking the
IoT device using SYN flooding and ICMP flooding and labeled
the data accordingly using Algorithm 1. Similarly, more attack
signatures can be given. The model is tested with the same
labeled data set by having a 60:40 split for training and testing
respectively. We chose the RandomForest classifier for its high
accuracy and effective classification.
Random Forest basically builds multiple decision trees and
couples them all to form a stable and accurate prediction.
Important reason for choosing Random forest is its ability to
rank features based on importance, which we will observe
in Section IV-B. Another advantage of this classifier is its
randomness, due to which over-fitting problem is avoided [14].
Algorithm 3 is thus quite straightforward in its operation.
It detects whether the data point from the anomaly detection
module is a known attack or not. If yes, it calls the Open
vSwitch VNF and applies appropriate flow rules to block the
malicious traffic.
IV. PERFORMANCE STUDY
A. Efficiency of Proposed Architecture (NETRA)
In this section, we compare the two architectures - VM-
based (OPNFV) and Docker-based (NETRA) - in terms of
6 100
 110
 120
 130
 140
 150
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
M
em
or
y 
(M
B)
Time (sec)
Memory comparison
Memory of RaspberryPi
Memory of Node
(a) Memory comparison between the two architectures.
 100
 102
 104
 106
 108
 110
 112
 114
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6
M
em
or
y 
in
 M
B
Time in mins
Memory requirements of docker
With 1 docker instance
With 2 docker instances
With 3 docker instances
With 4 docker instances
(b) Memory usage of multiple docker instances.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
OP
NF
V
 N
od
e 
to
 N
od
e
OP
NF
V
 N
od
e 
to
 O
DL
OP
NF
V
 F
ue
l m
as
te
r
 to
 N
od
e
Do
ck
er
 C
on
ta
in
er
 to
 c
on
ta
in
er
Do
ck
er
 C
on
ta
in
er
 to
 d
oc
ke
r h
os
t
Do
ck
er
 R
ou
te
r c
on
ta
in
er
 to
 d
ev
ice
Ti
m
e 
in
 m
icr
o 
se
co
nd
s
Latency comparison
(c) Latency comparison based on ICMP.
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
32 64 128 256 512 1024
Ti
m
e 
in
 m
illi
 s
ec
on
ds
Ping Packet Size (bytes)
Latency Test
(d) Latency test between external host and docker containers using
various sized ping requests.
Fig. 4: Memory requirements and Latency comparison.
key performance indicators such as storage, memory, latency,
network and scalability [15]. Also, we discuss how a container
based architecture helps us in deploying multiple VNFs in a
single host/device.
All these results are based on the experiments carried out
in lab setup. For the OPNFV architecture, the VMs were built
on top of a performance laptop having Intel i5 7th generation
processor, 16 GB RAM and 2TB HDD. For NETRA, the
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B has a 1.2 GHZ quad-core ARMv8
Cortex A53 processor and a Broadcom IV GPU with 1 GB
DDR2 RAM and in-built WLAN NIC.
1) Storage: In the case of OPNFV, there are minimum size
requirements that need to be met before deploying an open
stack environment. For a node that acts as the SDN controller
(based on OpenDayLight) with Ceph storage, OPNFV de-
mands 72GB storage. Similarly, a typical VNF node with just
the operating system requires a minimum of 25GB storage,
which is very unlikely for a network edge device.
In the case of NETRA, we can have multiple VNFs on a
Raspberry Pi which has only 16G of storage. Based on our
experiments, a single Raspbian image takes up only 126MB,
our WAP VNF image takes 182MB and our firewall VNF
takes up 157M. The docker instances use still lower sizes with
firewall instance taking 222B of storage and WAP instance
taking only 18 KB of storage.
2) Memory: As mentioned in Section II, OPNFV requires
the nodes to be PXE bootable. Based on our tests, PXE booting
with Fuel [8] required at least 1GB of RAM for each of the
nodes. The controller node had higher memory requirement of
2GB for running the java based OpenDayLight controller. In
our case, the Raspberry Pi 3 comes with only 1 GB of RAM.
But due to the very low memory foot prints of docker, we are
able to instantiate many VNF instances using the same.
The memory comparison of the two architectures is shown
in Fig. 4a. We observe that the memory of the node is high
due to the OS, which shoots up even more after starting the
hostapd service in the node. The peaks in the memory line
indicate the start of a docker instance. It can be noted that each
docker instance takes up only 1MB of RAM, which makes
docker the best choice for VNFs at the IoT gateway.
Fig. 4b shows the memory graphs of the Raspberry Pi as
a host when multiple docker containers are launched. We see
that the memory requirements of the docker instances are very
low and differ in the order of only 1 MB with 4 different tests.
The experiments were done by instantiating up to 4 docker
instances simultaneously in repeated iterations. The peaks in
the graphs explain the start of the docker instance, which later
come down.
3) Latency: When working with a chain of VNFs, it is
important to ensure that the latency between two VNFs is
as low as possible. In this section, we compare the latency
between different VNFs in both the architectures with the help
of pinging the nodes through ICMP. Fig. 4c shows that the
latency between the nodes in OPNFV is higher as compared
to the dockerized VNFs. This is due to the fact that, the docker
VNFs are in the same host while the VNFs in OPNFV are in
different VMs. We also note that the latency between the IoT
device and WAP VNF is quite high (10.2 ms), this is because,
the device is connected wirelessly to the WAP, where the losses
are quite high.
We carry out experiments to measure the latency with
different sizes of ping command. In Fig. 4d, we observe that
the latency is small on the order of milliseconds.
74) Network: Though the latency in NETRA is very less
compared to OPNFV, the number of network interfaces is
limited in our case, as the Raspberry Pi comes with only 2
NICs. In the case of OPNFV, the nodes have as many NICs
as the VM can support.
With many NICs, we can have many services like admin-
istration, orchestration, management communicating without
interference. But this comes with a trade-off, with more
connections, each connection requires a higher bandwidth link,
which is expensive. In NETRA, high bandwidth between the
VNFs is ensured since all the VNFs are practically on the
same device.
TABLE II: Throughput tests with iperf tool
Configuration Bandwidth(Mb/s) Buffer Size(Kb)
TCP (1 thread) 16.8 43.8
TCP (3 threads) 5.6 43.8
UDP 1.05 160
UDP with 100 Kbps bandwidth 0.1 160
To calculate the throughput performance of docker contain-
ers, we make use of the iperf tool available in Linux platforms.
As shown in Table II, we carry out simple iperf tests which
involve data transfer between the iperf client, the Docker
instance and an iperf server. A total of four tests are carried
out, the first one involving a TCP connection, the second one
with 3 parallel connections (the resulting throughput is per
connection), the third one with an UDP connection which
results in 2650 datagrams to be exchanged while the other
test involving a constrained bandwidth of 100 kbps resulted
in only 267 datagrams.
5) Average Load: Another important performance metric
to be considered is the average load of the host running the
dockers. The dockers should not use up the resources of the
host during their working. With low performance hosts as
in our case, it is very important to have a stable average
load in the long run. Fig. 5 shows the average load of the
Raspberry Pi running 4 docker instances. We see that the 1-
minute average increases with each docker instance, but the
long-term averages remain stable, implying that the system is
still stable. With these results, we can vouch that the Docker
containers indeed consume very little resources and thus scale
with even low performance edge devices.
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Fig. 5: Average load of the host from top command.
6) Scalability: The last, but important performance metric
is scalability. We can clearly see from the storage and memory
requirements that NETRA is very much scalable. For example,
we can have hundreds of firewall VNFs with individual
rule sets running on a simple raspberry pi having very less
computational strength.
Another important aspect of scalability is the deployment
times. In order to be scalable, the Docker environment should
also provide faster deployment time. In Table III, we can see
that the deployment time in running a Docker instance is as
low as a second. Time for building the image for the first
time, where it downloads everything from the cloud, is nearly
5 mins for our WAP VNF. In the case of OPNFV, we note
that we cannot expect such short deployment time. This can
be clearly seen from Table III as bringing up a complete node
takes nearly 15-20 minutes.
TABLE III: Deployment Time for VNFs
Process Time taken
OPNFV Bring up a VNF ∼ 20 minutes
OPNFV Start/Stop a VNF ∼ 5 minutes
HostAP Docker Time to build container for
the first time
2 minutes and
20 seconds
Firewall Docker Time to build container for
the first time
4 minutes and
16 seconds
HostAP Docker Time to build container 9 seconds
Firewall Docker Time to build container 5 seconds
HostAP Docker Time to run container < 1 second
Firewall Docker Time to run container < 1 second
B. Performance of NFV-based Edge Analysis for IoT Security
a) Feature Selection: We gather many features of the
network traffic. Few of the features are selected based on their
importance ranking to classify the traffic. In Fig. 6, features are
plotted according to their importance/ranking that can be found
using the feature importance package in the RandomForest
library.
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Fig. 6: Feature ranking in terms of importance
Additionally, we analyze the features using Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) with two components, that reduces the
feature set to a two dimensional space. It is evident from Fig. 7
that the data points from Normal and Attacked traffic are well
separated and thus distinguishable.
b) Traffic Classification: We perform experiments to
choose the appropriate classifier in terms of efficiency of attack
detection. In this experiment, we consider SYN attack, ICMP
attack to be distinguished from normal traffic. In Table IV,
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Fig. 7: PCA component analysis
confusion matrix for different classifiers are presented. From
the table, we observe that Random Forest is able to classify
626 out of 633 data points as normal traffic. One can see
the diagonal elements of the confusion matrix to visualize the
efficiency of the classifier. We calculate the accuracy for each
of the classifiers as
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(4)
where, TP, TN and FP, FN refer to True Positive, True
Negative, False Positive and False Negative, respectively.
It is observed that Random Forest classifier detects the
attacks more accurately among others. This is evident as prior
research shows Random Forest gives more accurate results
than SVM or Logistic Regression with a multi-class data
set [16].
TABLE IV: Confusion Matrix
Normal SYN attack ICMP attack
Linear SVM (Accuracy : 94.444%)
Normal 622 11 0
SYN attack 58 201 0
ICMP attack 0 0 350
Logistic Regression (Accuracy : 85.587%)
Normal 631 2 0
SYN attack 177 82 0
ICMP attack 0 0 350
KNN (Accuracy : 95.088%)
Normal 626 7 0
SYN attack 52 207 0
ICMP attack 1 1 348
Random Forest (Accuracy : 95.4911%)
Normal 626 7 0
SYN attack 49 210 0
ICMP attack 0 0 350
c) Response Time: The response time of the VNF is
defined as the time difference between initiation and detection
of the attack. We carried out a series of tests and found that
the average response time of the VNF is less than a second.
d) Throughput: During the attack the throughput
abruptly increases before detection of the attack and subse-
quent mitigation. Abrupt increase of throughput (in the scale
of thousands of bytes) due to attacks (TCP, ICMP flooding)
can be observed in Fig. 8. Due to this surge in throughput,
these attacks can be identified easily and mitigated. The attacks
are carried out on IoT devices like TP-Link camera, D-Link
smart camera etc. However, after attack mitigation is initiated
by concerned VNFs, normal traffic is restored i.e. throughput
drops down to hundreds of bytes.
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V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the existing works in the field of
NFV and docker containers.
In [17], the advantages of using containers over the existing
virtual machine solutions are discussed for virtualizing net-
work components. It is stated that container-based environment
provides lower latency and delay variations due to the usage
of lower-performing networking schemes. Deployment of a
container-based virtualized LTE core network is discussed in
[18]. The scope of the work was to deploy OpenEPC, an
EPC (LTE Evolved Packet Core) implementation using Docker
containers. A framework for deploying VNFs in a light-weight
Docker-based container environment is discussed in [19],
[20]. The proposed OpenNetVM is a highly efficient packet
processing framework is highly suited for high performance
network environments that use complex service chains.
In [9], the opportunities of virtualizing at the network
edge is discussed and Glasgow Network Function (GNF), a
container-based NFV platform that spawns lightweight con-
tainer VNFs, is presented. It is shown that this approach
saves up the core network utilization and provides a lower
latency. Requirements of IoT edge computing is discussed
in [21]. Lightweight virtualization technologies, containers and
unikernels, are compared as platforms for enabling scalability,
security and manageability in IoT edge computing. In [22],
various cybersecurity challenges and opportunities of IoT edge
computing are discussed. An approach for enforcing global
security policies in the federated cloud and IoT networks,
by implementing the policies on network slices, is described
in [23]. NFV and Service Function Chaining (SFC) are used
here for implementing the security policies. While these works
outline the possibility of using lightweight containers, they
do not carry out implementation in the context of IoT edge
security. Different from these works, we propose a novel
9lightweight Docker-based architecture for virtualizing network
functions to provide IoT security, implement and carry out
performance study.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed NETRA- a light-weight Docker-
based framework for deploying VNFs at the network edge
in order to make NFV compliant with IoT environment. We
described how this framework can be applied to enhance the
security of IoT. We presented traffic analysis at the network
edge for IoT security. This work suggests that NFV will greatly
benefit from container-based virtualization. Experimental re-
sults have shown that Docker-based VNFs perform well for
IoT than existing VM-based frameworks. Using the architec-
ture, VNFs that can improve the security of IoT environment
were implemented and tested using IoT devices like smart
cameras, smart sockets etc. Real time traffic from a TP-Link
camera were captured to train the edge-analysis VNF which
is able to successfully detect attacks with approximately 95%
accuracy within a second. The known attacks are mitigated
using appropriate VNFs, and we will study the handling of
zero-day attacks in future work. With this work, it is now
possible to envisage a scenario where all security VNFs can
be deployed at the IoT gateway itself effectively. Our research
motivates further investigation in improving security of IoT
devices at the network edge with the use of lightweight
containers, thus resulting in a smart and secure world of things.
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